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Abstract
The paper presents a test of the relationship between rational political
cycles with the government spending behavior and its efficiency by using
extensive data set of whole Indonesian municipalities/cities from 2008-
2014. The results show that politicians/local leaders in Indonesia tend
to maximize their preference during the election year but anticipate the
election time through strategy to deceive voters.
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1 Introduction
There are large studies report that political cycles influence government expendi-
ture. For example, Rogoff (1990) suggested that high pre-election expenditures
that are visible to voters may serve as a signal of ”competence,” meaning the
ability to provide more public goods. A politician on running re-election, there-
fore, increase spending especially items that voters observe to gain popularity.
Drazen and Eslava (2005) present a model that during pre-election, incumbent
manipulates spending before the election process with favor to rational voter
even though at initial voters and politicians have personal preferences for dif-
ferent types of government spending.
Several studies have been done to investigate the influence of political cycles
on government expenditure. Cross-country data investigation on this issue was
first tested by Brender and Drazen (2008). Drazen and Eslava (2005) provide
evidence of their model by using data on local public finances in Colombia.
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) investigate this issue in Brazilian municipal-
ities. Veiga and Veiga (2007) explore the case of Portuguese municipalities for
increasing expenditures when election time. Blais and Nadeau (1992) investi-
gated the case of ten provinces in Canada to show the effect of electoral cycles
to government expenditures. The closest paper with this research is paper by
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Sjahrir, Kis-Katos and Schulze (2013) (Hereafter, SKS). They found that the
impact of PBC not reliable in an indirect election system since incumbents do
not have an attachment to dominant political parties; therefore, they do not
have an incentive to use the discretionary budget. The impact becomes strong
when incumbent facing a direct election.
This study reports the tests of political cycles to government expenditure;
further, it influences to decomposed government expenditure. This study em-
ploys an extensive and precise dataset covering all Indonesian municipalities
from period 2008 -2014. By adding political variables and year of election, we
can obtain the effect of political cycles on government spending.
I use data of Indonesian municipalities not only to enrich literature on po-
litical business cycles (PBC)1, but also decentralization literature. The Indone-
sian government has experienced unique decentralization that allowing munic-
ipality/city governments to take benefit of their full revenue and expenditure
discretion. This decentralization allows politicians in the office only focus on
providing service in their electoral, not to satisfy upper tier government such
as provincial government or central government. Furthermore, the obtained
data set provides detail expenditure, revenue, development output, and region
accessories data which is allowing the investigation of political cycles effect in
detail. The data set is more detailed compared to Sakurai and Menezes-Filho
(2008); Geys (2007) data but quite similar with Veiga and Veiga (2007). This
study is also updated the research by Sjahrir, Kis-Katos and Schulze (2013)
where they have limited sample about the effect of PBC in Indonesia, especially
the dynamic after direct election policy. This paper offers wide and details ex-
penditure objective in comparison with SKS paper. Furthermore, this paper
investigated the relation between PBC and government expenditure efficiency,
which is different with SKS paper.
This study is using the fixed effect estimator to eliminate the regional het-
erogeneity, obtain a robust result. For timing, not only effect of the election year
is observed but also lagged variables of the election year are also investigated.
The paper presents some empirical findings that in decentralizing Indonesia,
government spending and voter favorite items spending fall during an election
year. The result remains robust even though decomposed expenditures are em-
ployed. Furthermore, personnel expenditure which is acts as a politician favorite
spending menu is increasing during an election year. It contradicts with other
papers argumentation that politician increases voter preferred menu during the
election year to capture a higher share of rational voters for re-election. How-
ever when a lag of election are employed, two-years lag contributes positive
significant to government expenditure and voter favorite spending menu.
These findings show new evidence that in Indonesia, politicians prefer to
maximize their utilities during an election year. Instead, to get a higher share
of rational voters, politicians show spending investment outcome to the voter,
which observed after a year after expenditure procured or before the election
1The studies on this area are abundant, for example see Veiga and Veiga (2007), Baleiras
and da Silva Costa (2004), Geys (2007),Brender and Drazen (2008) ,Rosenberg (1992), and
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008)
2
year. However, during election time, the politician is rational and faces a risk
that he/she will be not elected. Therefore, at this time politician prefers to
maximize their utilities in this period. The paper elucidates this phenomenon
by showing a shred of evidence that a high level of cost inefficiency as a proxy of
self-interest preference of politicians has a tremendous impact only during the
election year. Therefore, the politician enjoys two advantages in the election
year, first is not losing popularity because of the fruit of fierce spending results
before the election and the second is immense profits extracted from budget
inefficiency.
This study is organized as follows. The next section builds the theoretical
foundation on political cycles and government expenditures. Section 3 reviews
the political cycle and government expenditure structure in Indonesia. Section
4 explains the hypotheses statement and empirical specification including data
and model. Section 5 reports the results and discussion. Finally, the last section
withdraws several conclusions and policy recommendations.
2 Literature Reviews
The first study on political cycles theory was presented by Nordhaus (1975). He
shows that the incumbent would manipulate the economy to gain an electoral
vote. In their model, the incumbent pushes the monetary and fiscal policy
during a pre-election year, i.e., lowering the unemployment rate. During an
election year, voters observed a condition on what they rationally expect. In
essence, the officeholder repeatedly tricked the voters for their campaign interest.
Another theoretical study was presented by Rogoff (1990). He presents a
model that politicians have quite anticipated the election. The incumbent has
the advantage to observe information in the office; therefore, he has an incen-
tive to bias pre-election fiscal policy toward observed government expenditures,
away from government investment. In equilibrium, however, voters can deduce
the leader’s current competency by the degree to which he distorts tax and ex-
penditure policy. Voters’ decision should be governed by which candidate offers
them higher expected post-election welfare.
Based on both model, most empirical studies have made use of national-level
or municipal-level data on elections, policies, and economic outcome. Rosenberg
(1992) tested a hypothesis that a local authority incumbent who does not stand
for re-election effects a higher budgetary deviation in the pre-election period
than a comparable incumbent who does not seek re-election. Employing 15
Israel’s municipalities data, he shows that Incumbents were not seeking re-
election exhibit a deviation equivalent to 47% of the development budget, while
those seeking re-election exhibit a 12% deviation.
Geys (2007) used a dataset of local public debt in 296 Flemish municipalities
(1977-2000), they find that the election-year hike in debt growth rates increases
with the number of parties in the College of Mayor and Aldermen in Flem-
ish municipalities. They argue that the level of political fragmentation of the
government affects both the need for and possibility to engage in opportunistic
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policy cycles.
Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) use a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazil-
ian municipalities over 13 years (1988-2000) to analyze the influence of public
expenditures on the probability of mayors reelection. They suggest that mayors
who spend more during their terms of office increase the probability of reelection
or a successor of the same political party. In particular, higher capital spending
over the years preceding elections and current expenditures in election years are
beneficial to Brazilian incumbent mayors.
Veiga and Veiga (2007) present a test of rational political business cycle
models using a dataset of Portuguese municipalities from 1979-2001. Their
results reveal that the opportunistic behavior of local governments. In pre-
electoral periods, they increase total expenditures and change their composition
favoring items that are highly visible to the electorate.
The SKS paper did an empirical work on testing PBC on government spend-
ing in Indonesia municipals/cities from 2001 to 2008. They present that the
municipal/city which has an indirect election, PBC does not show any signifi-
cant result to total expenditure and administrative spending. They argue that
politicians under indirect election scheme have little incentive to manipulate the
expenditure to gain vote since sponsored party not hold domination on parlia-
ment. Consequently, those who are seeking the election has little loyalty to the
sponsored party. However post-2005, the stipulation of Law 32/2004 mandated
the direct election for all municipals and regents. As a result, they found PBC
has a substantial impact on government expenditure since incumbents have an
incentive to gain an electoral vote by spending the discretionary budget to tar-
geted indecisive voters.
The paper is aimed to complete the work by SKS with adding an investiga-
tion of PBC to budget allocation and its efficiency using the cost minimization
approach. Also, the study on Indonesia political cycles is under-researched both
national and sub-national level.
3 Political Cycle and Government Expenditure
Structure
Decentralization in Indonesia was governed by the constitution years 1945. Lo-
cal governments have authority to serve the citizen and have right to receive
a fiscal transfer from central. The local governments mainly provide public
goods such as infrastructure, education, health, social protection, and other
necessary public services. Expenditure discretion dominates revenue discretion
decentralization in Indonesia. The elected leader of local government has full
control to plan, budget, and execute their authorities to fulfill their function as
a government.
The elected leaders have a five-year period in charge in the office based on
Law No. 22 years 2014 on Local Government2. The leader can participate in
2Indonesian’ laws that govern the election mechanism are changes three times post-
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the next round election when their contract in the office is expired. The Law
regulates that incumbent only allowed to take participation for only once. If
they got elected again and wanted to continue to the third election, they can
offer as a vice-leader candidate. In simple, a politician can take office for an
extended period if they win the election in a row.
The elected leader has full control to decide the budget, full control on
spending but limited control on revenue or setting the tax rate. Law No. 33
years 2004 governs the authority of local government on planning and budgeting.
The law limits that Local Government only have control of commercial tax,
restaurant tax, and charge levies. These type of tax do not have a significant
effect on the voters in comparison with income tax and property tax. From
the expenditure side, the local governments are free to set their budget balance
but not allowed to deficit more than 10%. Through acceptance with the local
senate, they set the budget for one fiscal year (January to December). The
stipulated budget plan will be executed in the next year.
The setting that is explained by Nordhaus (1975) is fit than the model by
Rogoff (1990)3. In Indonesia, the executed output is seen by the voter by a year
forward when the budget plan approved by the local leader. Rogoff (1990) model
of rational opportunistic business cycles assumes that current local tax and
results of some investments made by the municipality are observed immediately
by the voters. Nordhaus (1975) suggested that the analysis should employ a
lag of year dummy of election to observe significant results. The next section
offers the hypothesis statement and an empirical specification using Nordhaus’s
suggestion.
4 Hypotheses and Empirical Specification
4.1 Hypotheses on political cycles and government expen-
diture
There are several hypotheses to be tested in this paper:
Hypothesis 1: Politician anticipates the election by reducing tax and increase
the budget at the pre-election stage.
Consider a model of two-period expenditure that is pre- and post-election.
The incumbent controls expenditure allocation on both periods since budget
determination for next fiscal year period (post-election) is also under incumbent
administrative. The following derivation is following Rosenberg (1992). Let µ
as a public satisfaction of government that depends on the supply of government
services and tax levy, such that:
independence. First was Law 23/1999 on Regional Government, then replaced by Law 32/2004
on Local Government and Local Autonomy, then the latest in Law 22/2014 on Local Auton-
omy
3Even though Nordhaus (1975) model using state example because it is related to the
national macroeconomic outcome, but it remains relevant to apply in municipal/city level.
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µ = V (X1) + V (X2)−H(T ) (1)
X1 and X2 are pre-election and election spending respectively, T is aggregate
tax, with V ′ > 0, V ” < 0 and H ′ > 0, H” < 0.
Let ρ as a probability of incumbents win the election, the vNM utility for
the incumbent is given by:
C = U(X1) + ρU(X2) + (1− ρ)W (Y ) (2)
Where W (Y ) is utility from alternative income (Y) if incumbent loses the
election. ρ and Y depend on how good the incumbent track record, which
reflected by public satisfaction µ.
ρ = f(µ) (3)
Y = Y (µ) (4)
If incumbent go for re-election, he prefers utilities on office than other alter-
native income, so that:
F = U(X2)−W (Y ) > 0 (5)
Maximized preference on office rather than other employment with respect to
second stage expenditure is given by:
dF
dX2
= U ′(X2)−W ′Y ′ dµ
dX2
≥ 0 (6)
Incumbent maximizes his utility, C with constraints given in (1),(3), and
(4):
dC
dX1
= U ‘(X1) + k
dµ
dX1
= 0 (7)
dC
dX2
= ρU ‘(X2) + k
dµ
dX2
= 0 (8)
Where k = dρdµ [U(X2) −W (Y ) + (1 − ρ)W ′Y ′] > 0 since U(X2) −W (Y ) > 0,
subtracting (8) to (7), deriving dµdX1 and
dµ
dX1
from (1), it can be obtained:
U ′(X1)− ρU ′(X2)
k
= V ′(X2)− V ′(X1) (9)
Equation (9) implies thatX1 > X2. Suppose thatX1 ≤ X2, then transitivity
implies U ′(X1) ≥ U ′(X2) > ρU ′(X2), thus L.H.S is strictly positive, but if
X1 ≤ X2 then V ′(X2) − V ′(X1) ≤ 0 which contradicts L.H.S. Thus spending
on lag of election is greater than spending due on election times.
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For illustration, the incumbent weight of unity under certainty on the pre-
election stage but had to weight ρ under uncertainty in the post-election stage.
Risk-averse incumbent should put X1 > X2.
Another hand, tax rate directly affected public satisfaction as proposed in
(1). Reducing the tax rate at the time of election increase the probability of
being elected.
Hypothesis 2: Politician raises voter preferred spending higher than non-
voter preferred in the preceding election.
Since government expenditure can be decomposed, politician offers many menus
of spending to voters and the voters pick on menus that are suited to them. Vot-
ers care for expenditures that are directly related to their needs, which usually
the primary public services. These services are education, infrastructure, health,
housing and public facilities. Drazen and Eslava (2005) divide the government
spending into two types, the first is ”targeted spending” which are spending to
provide service to voters. The second is ”non-targeted spending” which cate-
gorize a good that only has values to the politician but not to the voters. In
their work extension, Drazen and Eslava (2004) argue that politician targets
the swing voters by addressing these spending to them. Electoral manipulation
takes shape as increasing portion of targeted spending rather than an increase
in the overall budget since the politicians are well-aware of voter preference.
Hypothesis 3: Self-interest bureaucrats created a peak of public spending in-
efficiency only at the election year
Conybeare (1984) discussed the idea where bureaucrats tend to overproduce
and technically inefficient for providing public service. Migue´, Belanger and
Niskanen (1974) viewed the inefficiency where budget legislator maximizes the
budget that is untouched for production which in particular for politician’ satis-
faction expenditure. In this sense, inefficient bureaucrat increases stated budget
more than minimum cost over equivalent per-unit public good produces. In re-
lation with the first hypothesis, indeed technical inefficiency during is observed
in every term of budget cycles however during election time, politician weight
spending on personal satisfaction the most which are captured by the peak of
the inefficiency of public spending.
4.2 Empirical Model
The empirical specification follows Veiga and Veiga (2007), which is written as
follows:
yit = α0 + β1Electionit + βiXit + ci + et + it
Where yit is the interested dependent variables, which are government ex-
penditure (including its decomposition, i.e., capital spending, routine spending,
grant, and subsidy), budget balance, and tax. Electionit is dummy variable
that states the timing of election in municipal i in year t. Xit is control vari-
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Figure 1: Political Stage and Voters’ Perception
ables which are population, per-capita GDP, and household income. ci, et, and
it are regional fixed terms, national trend error, and panel error.
The other model is employing lag of election since Nordhaus (1975) noticed
that voters do not directly observe the result of development from budget ex-
penditure plan. Therefore to show the results of investment to a voter in the
campaign year, the politician should budget the fiscal expenditure two years
before the election year. Figure 1 demonstrates the process.
For k ∈ (1, 2), the empirical specification with lag is written as follows:
yit = α0 + βkElectioni(t−k) + βiXit + ci + et + it
This paper employs a fixed effect estimation to obtain robust results and
eliminating the regional effect. For k ∈ (0, 1, 2), both equations therefore is
expressed as follows:
˙yit = α0 + β˙kElectioni(t−k) + β˙iXit + et + ˙it
The mentioned models are useful to test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 but
to test hypothesis 3, inefficiency measurement must be clearly defined. There-
fore, the technical inefficiency is measured by the gap between the observed cost
to produce public goods over possible observed minimized cost with equivalent
public goods produces (Chalil, 2018). The Time-variant Stochastic Frontier
Analysis can measure technical inefficiency by using a cost minimization func-
tion for a panel data (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2003).
For observed public goods produces, the panel efficiency model takes form
as follows:
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lnCit(j) = β0t(j) +
∑
n
βnit(j)lnXnit(j)
+ εit(j) − µit(j)
βit(j) = β0t(j) − µit(j)
βit(j) = ωi(j)1 + ωi(j)2t+ ωi(j)2t
2
µˆit(j) = βˆ0t(j) − βˆit(j)
TE = exp(−µˆit(j))
Where Cit(j) is policy objective j expenditure in municipal/city i at time t.
xit(j) represents output factors that is a number of output product factor that
provided by municipal/city government i at time t. εit(j) is time-variant random
noise and µit(j) is time invariant inefficiency terms, both are assumed to be i.i.d..
The time-variant inefficiency is defined as difference of maximum intercept of
output factor with estimated intercept (βˆ0t(j) = maxi(βˆit(j))) (Kumbhakar and
Lovell, 2003).
There are two spending objectives for measuring technical inefficiency. Health
spending and education spending are selected since it accounts for a plenty por-
tion of the government budget. Additionally, the voters concern about it since it
is the basic needs (fundamental goods/services on voter’s preference). Therefore,
the sizes of inefficiency that captured on these expenditures reflect the interest
of bureaucrats. If the size is immense, then the bureaucrats are ”self-oriented”
where they care about maximizing their self-preference. If the size is tiny, then
the bureaucrats are ”voter-interest” where they care about maximizing voter
preference.
For cost inefficiency of health services; immunization coverage, morbidity
rate, and birth by nursery are chosen as a proxy for goods or services on health
produces with following health expenditure as observed cost. For inefficiency of
education services, Literacy rate and net enrollment ratio for elementary, junior
high, and high school level are the representatives of products of education
service with following education expenditure as observed cost.
4.3 Data
The interested independent variable is the timing of the election. Since the data
of exact election year is not available, a dummy variable is created. The vari-
able takes value one if it is a one year lag of the first-year period of a mid-term
development plan. Data of municipal/city development plan document is avail-
able on the Ministry of Development Planning. The period of Municipal/city
mid-term development plan document tells us about an effective year when the
local leader takes the office. Therefore I assume that lag of the first period
of mid-term plan document is the election year. The rest of the variables are
available on the Indonesian Database for Policy and Economic Research (INDO-
DAPOER), The World Bank. The panel data covers 488 municipals/cities from
2008 to 2014.
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The following paragraph is the description of the dependent variables:
• Budget Balance: is the balance sheet of local government i in year t. This
variable presents a test if local leader takes advantage to reduce the deficit
(or surplus) during the election year. The variable is in billion rupiahs with
adjustment from the 2010 year based;
• Original Tax or Retribution: is an amount of retribution, charge levies,
and original tax (in Billion Rupiah, adjusted with the 2010 year based).
A negative relation gives a hint about the local leader tends to reduce tax
to gain vote shares;
• Total Expenditure: is total expenditure (in billion Rupiahs, adjusted with
the 2010 year based) of local government. A negative relation implies the
politician maximizes their revenue at election year. However, a positive
coefficient on the lag two election implies that politician cares on invest-
ment outcome;
• Capital Expenditure: is expenditure (in billion Rupiahs, adjusted with
the 2010 year based) by the local government to gain fixed asset or in-
vestment. Since the politician made an immense investment before the
election, therefore, the coefficient of lag two election is positive;
• Personnel Spending expenditure (in billion Rupiahs, adjusted with the
2010 year based) related to personnel officers spending including wage,
honorarium, transportation cost, and operation cost. If a politician max-
imize their preference on an election year, the correlation should be posi-
tive;
• Grant : is a grant (in Billion Rupiah, adjusted with the 2010 year based) to
the lower-tier government, the public company, NGO, and citizens which
is not binding;
• Subsidy : is not binding expenditure (in Billion Rupiah, adjusted with
the 2010 year based) for a special purpose, i.e., stabilizing price, reviving
economy, and others; and,
• Functional Expenditure: is a decomposed expenditure into several basic
service functions. There are eleven functions: agricultural, economic, ed-
ucation, environmental, health, housing, infrastructure, social protection,
public law, and tourism-related function.
The other dependent variable is the cost inefficiency of health and education
expenditure. The listed output products as a proxy of public service provided
in these sectors are listed as follows:
• Percentage of children taking immunization: is a percentage of children
taking immunization in the nearest public hospital to a population of
eligible children for immunization;
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• morbidity rate: is a proportion with which disease appears in a population;
• Birth by Nursery : is a percentage of childbirth attended by an official
nurse;
• NER elementary : is a percentage of children enrolled in elementary school
to the population of children of elementary school age;
• NER junior high: is a percentage of children enrolled in junior high school
to the population of children of junior high school age;
• NER senior high: is a percentage of children enrolled in senior high school
to the population of children of senior high school age;
• Literacy rate: is a percentage of literate people in the total population.
Several control variables are employed to control panel heterogeneity, which
are:
• Fiscal Transfer Received : is an amount (in billion Rupiahs, adjusted with
2010 year based) of fiscal transfer from central government to munici-
pal/city i in year t;
• Total Population: is the number of population (in thousand persons) in
municipal/city i in year t;
• Per Capita GDP : is annual per capita GDP (in thousand rupiah, adjusted
with 2010 year based) in municipal/city i;
• Household spending : is annual household expenditure (in thousand rupiah,
adjusted with 2010 year based) in municipal/city i;
Table 1 presents the statistical summary.
5 Results
Table 2 presents the first estimations. The estimations are using OLS fixed effect
estimator. This table only employs election year as the interested variable, and
it shows the strong evidence that budget balance, total expenditure, and capital
expenditure fall in such large amount during the election year. The coefficients
are statistically significant at 1% confidence level.
The results confirm the first hypothesis where the local leaders maximize
their preference during the election year. Local leaders not only maximize their
benefit facing the risk of failure to be elected but also trap their competitor
who will take office next period if incumbents are not elected. Since the output
of expenditure procurement when local leader out of office is delay observed,
they can criticize new government based on results of development which are
they initially set. It is the reasons why coefficients of total expenditure, capital
expenditure, and budget balance are significantly negative. A positive sign of
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personnel expenditure coefficient means the politician extracts their benefit by
taking shares of government expenditure, but the coefficient is not statistically
significant.
Since voters directly observe the tax rate, politicians play their strategy by
reducing tax to gain popularity. The fall of tax amount in election years shows
this phenomenon. The coefficient is negative and significant at 1% level, which
supports the hypothesis. However, politicians are not likely increasing subsidy
and grant during election time since the coefficients of grant and subsidy are
not significant at any level.
Table 3 presents the results when lags of the election year are employed.
Column (1) presents similar results with table 2. Column (2) presents the re-
sult during the pre-election period. There are not many changes in politicians
behavior in this period, but at this period politicians reduce the personnel ex-
penditure. Column (3) shows the results that comply with the prediction. Since
the politicians anticipate the election and strategically showing the investment
results during the election year, they are budgeting an increase spending for
investment which is proxied by capital spending. The coefficient for capital
spending is positive and statistically significant in this period (lag two years
before the election). Since capital spending accounts a large share of total
spending, total expenditure also increase.
Tax is not affected since politicians not seeking any popularity during this
period. Personnel spending is positive and significant at 1% level indicates that
politicians allocate massive operation cost for execution in the next period, and
budget balance is positive. Deploying election and its lag, grant, and subsidy
are not affected.
Table 4 is showing an empirical test of the second hypothesis where the
expenditure is decomposed into 11 types of function. This decomposition allows
us to understand which menu is favorite and can be physically observed by the
voters. Rogoff (1990) model tells us that opportunistic politicians can also
signal competence by strategically managing the composition of expenditures,
increasing spending on items highly visible to the electorate and decreasing
spending on those items that are not so visible.
Revisits table 1, local governments concentrate their expenditure on infras-
tructure, education, health, and general administration since this type of ex-
penditures consume a significant portion of the budget. Education, health,
and infrastructure expenditure are closely related with essential public services,
which are the voter favorite menus of spending.
In the election year, the politicians trap the next winner of election contest
by reducing the budget of these spending. The coefficients of election year on
infrastructure, education, and health spending are negative and statistically
significant.
In lag (2) year of election, I expect a positive sign since politicians invest a
plenty amount for this spending and enjoy the fruit of investment in this sector
during the election year. The coefficients are positive for infrastructure and
health but not significant at any confidence level. The items are significant and
positive during this period only tourism, and environmental related spending
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but this menus are not voters’ favorite.
Finally, table 5 presents an empirical test of the third hypothesis. It should
be noted that the cost efficiency that is produced by panel frontier range from
0 (perfect efficient) to infinity (perfect inefficient). The relevant results are pre-
sented in panel B. The impact of the election year for both health and education
expenditure cost inefficiency are significantly large and positive. In comparison
with the impact of the period before the election year, the coefficients are small
(0.01) or equal to zero. These results confirm the third hypothesis that cost
inefficiency has the enormous value only at election year. This evidence elu-
cidates politicians maximize their ”self-interest” preference when facing risk
before stripped out from the office. Politicians carefully not reveal their self-
interest action by increasing personnel budget during election year since the
voters have access to monitor public budget in general4. Therefore, they de-
ceive the voters by not to increase personnel expenditure in the election year
but taking profit on budget execution, which is captured by cost inefficiency in
providing public services. The deceived voters do not see something wrong on
the budget plan, and they do not have symmetric information about how the
budget is executed. As a consequence, politicians do not lose popularity while
enjoying the profit from a manipulated budget.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence of political cycles and government ex-
penditure in Indonesia. Using a large dataset local government expenditure
covering the 2008-2014 period, the local leaders tend to manipulate their ex-
penditure in anticipation of the election.
Depart from Nordhaus (1975) model; the paper shows that local leaders
maximize their benefit during the election year by reducing investment-related
expenditure, but reduce the tax rate at this period to deceive the voters. How-
ever, the politicians correctly anticipate the election by showing the voters of
development results on the election year, which is a fruit of investment they do
on two years lag of budgeting process. The positive sign of capital expenditure
two years before the election shows this fact.
When expenditure is decomposed into function spending, politician signif-
icantly reduces spending for voter favorite spending menu at the year of the
election means it does not affect the election outcome. Conversely, when em-
ploying the crucial lag, politician tends to increase spending for voter preferred
menu, but there is no adequate evidence to infer the relationship. Overall, the
findings in this paper similar with Veiga and Veiga (2007) who use Portuguese
municipals data but contrary with Drazen and Eslava (2005) who use Colom-
bia data. Further, this paper explores the effect of the election on spending
4Law No.32 years 2004 on Local Government, Law No.25 years 2004 on National Devel-
opment Planning System, and Law No.14 years 2008 on Public Information Disclosure states
that the local governments are mandated to consult their budget plan to the public and publish
the budget document in local media (electronic or non-electronic).
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inefficiency where the previous papers not. Indeed, politicians maximize their
self-interest profit on election year since they face a risk of not elected but not
afraid to lose popularity since they deceive the voters by the fruit of spending
before the election.
This paper offers the evidence that politicians play an unhealthy strategy
to compete with other competitors through expenditure manipulation. In some
case, it will create development discontinuity and instability in the dynamic
of the government office also distrust of voters to the government. Therefore,
higher tier government should act as a fair judge or referee on observing local
leaders behavior when they set a development plan and budget. Higher tier gov-
ernment can take several policies for illustration providing technical assistance
and monitoring for planning and budgeting process in municipal/city level, lim-
iting deficit, and relaxing budget revision when the winning candidate takes
office.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Political Cycles Variables
Timing of Election 3316 0.18 0.38 0 1
Dependent Variables (In billion Rupiah)
Budget Balance 2147 9.86 192.45 -5461 976.42
Original Tax or
Retribution
2775 183.11 264.52 0 5583.16
Total Expenditure 2154 771.19 509.18 39.31 4942.25
Capital Expenditure 2664 203.49 487.17 0 23624.39
Overhead Spending 2680 401.01 295.77 0 2541.13
Grant Spent 2679 1e−4 6e5 5e−7 0.01
Subsidy Spent 886 2e−5 4e−5 2e−7 4e−4
Function expenditure
General Administration
Function Spending
2179 212.09 152.85 2.91 2956.72
Agricultural Function
Spending
2172 30.21 29.64 0 1061.02
Economic development
function spending
2176 16.38 21.53 0 690.65
Education function
spending
2176 259.47 230.48 0 3298.4
Environmental related
function spending
2176 14.94 39.8 0 1158.32
Health service
function spending
2177 71.79 65.41 0 1777.82
Housing and public
facilities function spending
2177 5.1 15.69 0 253.6
Infrastructure related
spending
2177 115.57 130.67 0 3145.71
Social protection
function spending
2177 6.13 6.5 0 127.61
Public, Law, and order
function spending
2177 7.57 5.79 0 107.05
Tourism related
function spending
2177 3.98 7.24 0 204.02
Public Services Provided
NER Elementary 3290 93.9 11.66 7 198
NER Junior high 3290 68.3 14.13 1 170
NER Senior high 3286 50.5 14.42 0 110
Literacy rate 3290 93 14.49 11 198
% Birth by nursery 3289 76.84 22.12 0 190
Immunization coverage 3290 93.9 13.48 3 198
Morbidity rate 2808 31.08 9.98 7 94
Control Variables
Fiscal Transfer
Received
2329 580.82 382.34 21.18 6171.13
Total Population 2821 496.15 618.51 6.14 5202.1
GDP per Capita (In
thousand Rupiah)
2820 9212.71 18141.83 40.69 3e5
Household Spending (in
thousand Rupiah)
2844 569.59 221.29 170.93 2018.04
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Table 2: Election Year with Government Revenue and Expenditure
Variables Budget
Bal-
ance
Tax Total
Expen-
diture
Capital
Expen-
diture
Personnel
Expen-
diture
Grant Subsidy
Timing of
Election
−18.02∗∗∗ −12.63∗∗∗ −30.67∗∗∗ −30.38∗∗∗ 2.62 −3e−6 5e−6
(6.86) (4.89) (7.59) (4.66) (4.07) (0.00) (0.00)
Fiscal
Transfer
Received
−0.82∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 1e−7∗∗∗ −7e−8∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (2e−8) (3e−9)
Total Popu-
lation
0.57∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 7e−7∗∗∗ 2e−7∗∗∗
(0.1) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.00) (1e−8)
GDP per
Capita
−1e−3∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ −4e−4 0.01∗∗∗ 2e−9 −1e−9∗∗∗
(7e−4) (4e−4) (8e−4) (5e−4) (4e−4) (0.00) (2e−10)
Household
Spending
0.07∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 2e−7∗ 4e−8∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 177.1∗∗∗ −328.1∗∗∗ −140.6∗∗∗ 46.21 −127.0∗∗∗ −4e−4∗∗∗ −3e−5
(46.78) (26.84) (51.81) (31.83) (27.8) (1e−4) (0.00)
Observations 1,765 1,876 1,765 1,764 1,765 1,439 554
R-squared 0.638 0.451 0.402 0.082 0.469 0.06 0.16
Number of
id
488 488 488 488 488 487 291
Notes: Dependent variables are in Billions Rupiah. The estimations were carried
using fixed effect model. Standard errors in brackets; *** denotes significance at
1% level, **at 5% and * at 10%.
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Table 3: Election Year (lag) with Government Revenue and Expenditure
(1) (2) (3)
Independent
Variable
Election
Year
Election
Year
(Lag 1)
Election
Year
(Lag 2)
DepVar:
Budget Bal-
ance
−18.02∗∗∗ −22.17∗∗∗ 14.24∗∗∗
(6.86) (7.1) (4.89)
Tax −12.63∗∗∗ 3.9 0.51
(4.89) (5.21) (5.21)
Total Expen-
diture
−30.67∗∗∗ −18.30∗∗∗ 14.75∗∗∗
(7.6) (7.89) (5.56)
Capital Ex-
penditure
−30.38∗∗∗ −13.01∗∗∗ 8.63∗∗∗
(4.67) (4.91) (3.49)
Personnel Ex-
penditure
2.63 −8.46∗∗∗ 6.85∗∗∗
(4.08) (4.28) (2.74)
Grant −3e−6 1e−6 −4e−6
(2e−5) (2e−5) (1e−5)
Subsidy 5e−6 −2e−6 3e−7
(4e−6) (4e−6) (5e−6)
Control YES YES YES
Number of ID 488 488 488
Notes: Dependent variables are in Billions Rupiah. Control variables are fiscal
transfer received, total population, per capita GDP, and household spending. The
estimations were carried using fixed effect model. Standard errors in brackets; ***
denotes significance at 1% level, **at 5% and * at 10%.
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Table 4: Election Year (lag) with Decomposed Government Expenditure
(1) (2) (3)
Independent Variable Election
Year
Election
Year
(Lag 1)
Election
Year
(Lag 2)
DepVar:
Voter Favourite Spend-
ing
Education function spend-
ing
−12.88∗∗∗ 3.95 -0.83
(6.56) (6.91) (8.14)
Infrastructure related
spending
−15.5∗∗∗ −9.84∗∗ 5.75
(5.53) (5.81) (7.17)
Health service function
spending
−4.78∗∗ −4.13∗ 2.44
(2.85) (3) (3.89)
Housing and public facilities
function spending
-0.51 -0.92 0.33
(0.61) (0.64) (0.66)
Voter Non-Favourite
Spending
General Administration
Spending
-2.68 -3.56 3.29
(5.26) (5.49) (6.98)
Agricultural Function
Spending
−4.18∗∗∗ -0.59 1.26
(1.64) (5.21) (2.25)
Economic development
function spending
-1.69* -1.46 -0.07
(1.16) (1.21) (1.58)
Environmental related func-
tion spending
−2.36∗∗ −2.31∗ 2.40∗∗∗
(1.45) (1.52) (1.14)
Social protection function
spending
−0.76∗∗∗ −0.44∗ 0.36
(0.29) (0.31) (0.32)
Public, Law, and order func-
tion spending
0.00 -0.27 0.01
(0.23) (0.24) (0.28)
Tourism related function
spending
-0.52 -0.65 1.07∗∗
(0.39) (0.41) (0.58)
Control YES YES YES
Number of ID 476 476 476
Notes: Dependent variables are in Billions Rupiah. Control variables are fiscal
transfer received, total population, per capita GDP, and household spending. The
estimations were carried using fixed effect model. Standard errors in brackets; ***
denotes significance at 1% level, **at 5% and * at 10%.
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Table 5: Technical Inefficiency and Election
Panel A
DepVar: Health DepVar: Education
Variables Expenditure Variables Expenditure
Immunization Coverage −0.16∗∗ NER Elementary 0.36∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.02)
Morbidity rate −0.13∗∗∗ NER Junior High 0.72∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.01)
% Birth by Nursery 0.14∗∗∗ NER Senior High −0.13∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.01)
Literacy Rate 0.37∗∗∗
(0.02)
t −0.09∗ t 41.39∗∗∗
(0.05) (1.45)
t2 −0.03∗∗∗ t2 −20.93∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.72)
Constant 3.64∗∗∗ Constant −1.05∗∗∗
(0.30) (0.13)
Observations 2,161 Observations 2,157
Number of id 488 Number of id 488
Log-Likelihood -944.8 Log-Likelihood -1996
lambda 0.26 lambda 0.51
TE Mean 0.58 TE Mean 0.35
S.D. 0.34 S.D. 0.29
Panel B
DepVar: Health (TE) DepVar: Education (TE)
Variables Variables
Election Year 0.25∗∗∗ Election Year 0.26∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Election Year (Lag 1) −0.01∗∗ Election Year (Lag 1) 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Election Year (Lag 2) 0.01∗∗ Election Year (Lag 2) 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Control Yes Control Yes
Notes: Dependent variables are in Billions Rupiah. All variables in Panel A are
taking logarithmic form. The estimators were carried using ML Time-Variant
Stochastic Frontier. The estimations on Panel B were carried using fixed effect
model. Standard errors in brackets; *** denotes significance at 1% level, **at 5%
and * at 10%.
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